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Abstract 
Purpose 
Our paper explores the influence of duality in institutional logics on internal accounting, with 
a focus on a Polish public university. More particularly, we answer the research question: how 
does illegitimacy risk arising from the divergent pressures of the institutional environment 
impact management accountings in this institution? 
Design/Methodology/Approach 
We seek to uncover intricacies of notions of internal legitimacy façade, decoupling and counter-
coupling in practice. We explore details of organizational responses involving management 
accounting aimed at reducing illegitimacy risk. Achieving good organizational access, we adopt 
a qualitative case study approach involving contextual appreciation/document 
analysis/participant observation/discussion with key actors: facilitating building upon 
theoretical argumentation through finding things out from the field. 
Findings 
We uncover and discuss organizational solutions and legitimizing manoeuvres applied, 
identifying four adaptation tactics in the struggle to support legitimacy that we term 
µFHUHPRQLDO FDOFXODWLRQV¶ µOHJLWLPDF\ ODEHOOLQJ¶ µEODFNER[LQJ¶ DQG µVKDGRZ PDQDJHPHQW
DFFRXQWLQJ¶7KHVH FDQ EH VHHQ LQ UHODWLRQ WRGHFRXSOLQJ DQGFRXQWHU-coupling. Ceremonial 
calculations supported the internal façade. Shadow management accounting supported pro-
effectiveness. Legitimacy labelling and blackboxing helped bind these two organizational 
layers, further supporting legitimacy. In interaction the four tactics engendered what can be 
VHHQDVDµFRXQWHU-FRXSOLQJ¶RIPDQDJHment accounting. We clarify impacts for management 
accounting. 
Research limits/implications 
The usual limitations of case research apply for generalisability. Theorising of management 
accounting in relation to contradictory logics is advanced. 
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Practical implications 
The paper illuminates how management accounting can be understood vis-à-vis contradictory 
logics. 
Originality value 
Elaboration of the tactics and their interaction is a theoretical and empirical contribution. Focus 
on a Polish university constitutes an empirical contribution. 
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Introduction 
Our paper, drawing from a neo-institutional perspective (Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006; 
Lounsbury, 2008), explores influences of contending institutional logics on internal accounting 
practices, the latter seen substantively in terms of organizational protection against illegitimacy 
risk. This complex issue relates to existing deliberations pertaining to accounting as 
product/outcome and tool of organizational legitimacy (Meyer, 1986; Richardson, 1987; 
Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1991; Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Fernandez-Revuelta Perez and 
Robson, 1999; Power, 2003). 
Prior research (Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995) has indicated possible reactions to social and 
organizational pressures engendered by changing institutional settings. The scope of reactions 
identified extends from intentional or involuntary adjustments, to preserve institutional 
legitimacy, through to actions oriented towards changing social expectations (legitimacy 
entrepreneurship) and various strategies oriented to creating particular images of activity, 
entailing strategic legitimacy. Especially regarding strategic legitimacy, prior studies suggest 
that when meeting adjustment challenges, or anticipating threatening divergence from their 
interests, organizations decouple (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Laine, 2009; Cho et al., 2015a) and 
construct a symbolic legitimacy façade. Reflecting the level of consistency between façade 
endeavours and pro-effective/functional actions, theorists distinguish coupling (Rautiainen, 
2010), loose-coupling (Lukka, 2007) and counter-coupling (Burrell Nickell and Roberts, 2014).  
In more rational modelling of organizational decision-making, talks, decisions and actions ± 
and accounting D NLQG RI µWDON¶ particularly - tend to be coupled in a rational, consistent 
progression. Institutional and organizational complexities can require a µloose¶ coupling 
(Lukka, 2007; Moll and Hoque, 2011). Some distinguish counter-coupling, involving building 
contradictions amongst talks, decisions and actions but so as to handle contending/contradictory 
logics and maintain organizational legitimacy (Cho et al., 2015a, p.81; Brunsson, 2007). In 
relation to the more general phenomenon of decoupling, counter-coupling necessarily involves 
contradictions between/within the talks, decisions and actions1 as well as linking organizational 
layers in a strategic intervention where logics are not only different but contending.  
As we highlight in elaborating upon our theoretical framing and prior related literature below, 
prior research analysing the influence of illegitimacy risk associated with contending 
institutional logics on management accounting is scarce. How information usage is affected by 
efforts to safeguard organizational legitimacy has been researched so far primarily vis-à-vis 
external disclosures, where the main focus (e.g., Cho et al., 2015a,b; Killian and O'Regan, 2016) 
has been phenomena related to transmission to the public realm of information ostensibly 
displaying organizational honesty and responsibility. We acknowledge and draw upon prior 
research but aim to contribute here through diminishing an existing gap in the literature. We 
seek to explore in practice, in relation to management accounting, details of internal legitimacy 
façade, decoupling and counter-coupling as responses to divergent institutional pressures and 
associated illegitimacy risk.  
Our choice of focal organization and access thereto for the research permits deep exploration 
of theoretical constructs around legitimacy and management accounting and in the rarely 
considered context of Polish higher education (HE). In Poland, lack of institutional stability, 
shaping legitimacy-gaining and legitimacy-protecting processes (Bitektine and Haack, 2015), 
followed the post-1989 transition. The transition involved all areas of economic and social life 
and engendered radical reconstruction of institutional milieu. New market institutions, with 
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 In our analysis we especially uncover contradictions within talks (i.e. within management accounting). 
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ostensibly varying success, at least partially suppressed previous social patterns of centrally 
controlled socialistic economy. The rapid change fostered institutional chaos, engendering a 
parallel functioning of a multitude of often contradictory institutions, with varying acceptance 
across differing social groups. An example of duality in institutional logics important for HE 
institutions concerns the issue of charging fees. A new model of the entrepreneurial university 
6XáNRZVNL and Seliga, 2016) suggested fee-charging following market rules, helping 
universities maximise revenues in a competitive environment. Concurrently, however, legal 
regulations required HE institutions to charge students no more than the cost of studies àDGD
2015), continuing a cost model formerly operating in the centrally planned economy.  
We present results of a case study of a Polish public HE institution.2 The approach followed 
allows exploration of management accounting in relation to contending institutional logics. We 
sought to answer the question: how does illegitimacy risk arising from divergent institutional 
logics impact tKH XQLYHUVLW\¶V PDQDJHPHQW DFFRXQWLQJ" &Rnsidering the environment¶V
complexity, we focus on the influence of two contending logics in fee-charging, market- and 
cost-oriented. Our access and detailed analysis leads us to uncover four organizational 
manoeuvres we name adaptation tactics ± ceremonial methods, shadow management 
accounting, legitimacy labelling and blackboxing ± which we elaborate upon in analysis and 
discussion of our case.3 Ceremonial calculations supported the internal legitimacy façade while 
shadow management accounting supported on-going pro-effectiveness concerns, a form of 
decoupling. Legitimacy labelling and blackboxing helped to keep these two organizational 
layers together, further supporting legitimacy. In interaction, the four tactics can be seen to 
engender a counter-coupling of management accounting reflecting the divergent pressures 
arising from the parallel existence of contending logics. We rely on several evidence sources. 
We analyse documents concerning fee calculations for full-time and part-time degree studies, 
and non-degree postgraduate studies, together with procedures involved in preparing these. We 
extend insights from this through participant observation, allowing access to internal 
deliberations on fee levels, and via discussions with those preparing and using financial data.  
Our paper is structured as follows. We firstly elaborate upon the theoretical framing and related 
prior literature. This helps articulate the key theoretical argumentation and prior research we 
seek to expand and build upon, the gap we seek to address, and the rationale for our focus and 
question. It also indicates the case for our particular research approach and method. Secondly, 
we present a contextual analysis of our focus, covering material informing the main analysis. 
Thirdly, we outline and discuss the research method used in the main empirical analysis, 
bringing out its strengths for our particular study. Fourthly, we present our case study research. 
We present results from a case analysis exploring fee and cost calculations in full-time degree, 
part-time degree and non-degree postgraduate programmes. We discuss organizational 
solutions and legitimizing manoeuvres involving management accounting manifest in our case. 
We elaborate upon the internal legitimacy façade in relation to decoupling and highlight 
counter-coupling practices uncovered. Finally, we offer concluding comments.  
Contending logics, legitimacy and management accounting: theoretical framework and 
related prior literature 
In this section, we delineate theoretical constructs, drawing from neo-institutional theorising, 
of importance to us here. We refer to and review organizational and accounting literature as 
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 Most large Polish universities, including the focal university analysed, are state institutions. They are mostly, but 
typically not entirely, funded from government grants and often called public universities as distinct from non-
public. They are non-profit but not charities. 
3
 Use of the word tactics here is not to suggest the presence in all instances of a strong intentionality. What we 
term tactics may be emergent adaptive practices.  
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appropriate. We acknowledge insights from prior research but we mainly confirm that very 
little research has been done exploring management accounting¶V PRELOLVDWLRQ to protect 
organizations from illegitimacy risk arising from contending institutional logics. In 
summarising this section, we emphasise our concern to respond to a gap in prior research by 
seeking to answer our research question and indicate what this implies in terms of the approach 
and methods for the current study.  
The general theoretical perspective framing our research reflects the view of accounting as in 
part shaped by institutional milieu (Burchell et al.,1980; Meyer, 1986; Richardson, 1987). We 
see dynamic socio-economic forces consequentially helping shape internal as well as external 
accounting practices and their usages. We are influenced by authors (Ribeiro and Scapens, 
2006; Lounsbury, 2008) locating this approach in social neo-institutionalism, linking analysis 
of accounting with its social role, perception and impact. A key theoretical concept explaining 
relations between institutional environment and accounting is legitimacy: ...a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions (Suchman, 
1995, p.574). Legitimacy involves perceptions RIDQRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VDFWLRQVWKDWDUH manifest or 
taken as given by individuals or groups in society (Suddaby et al., 2017). Stakeholders reflect 
various expectations, often incoherent, addressed to organizations assessed by their institutional 
milieu (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). This assessment influences significantly the organization-
environment relationship, impacting organizational performance (Deephouse and Suchman, 
2008; Sonpar et al., 2010). Temporary and stable divergence between expectations linked to 
institutional logics and the image of organizational performance constitutes a legitimacy gap 
(Hoque, 2006). To reduce this, the organization must understand the system of social prizes and 
penalties termed legitimacy rent and illegitimacy discount (Suddaby et al., 2017). We are 
influenced by acknowledgement in prior work of the two-dimensional role played by 
accounting as both result of adjusting to pressures and active creator of perceptions.  
Organizational legitimacy as an abstract theoretical construct is differently articulated in 
various frames. In accounting research, legitimacy is mainly regarded as convergence of an 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶Voverall image with valid norms, values and social beliefs (Kent and Zunker, 
2013). Lack of convergence in any aspect threatens legitimacy. Some researchers (e.g. Ogden 
and Clarke, 2005), however, prefer a fragmentary approach, where legitimacy is understood as 
convergence with specific expectations. Thus, an organization could have legitimacy in one 
area but concurrently lack it in another (Suchman, 1995). The fragmentary approach has appeal 
for this study as encouraging concentrated focus. Another important difference in existing 
approaches to organizational legitimacy concerns audience endowment. Depending upon 
research aim, legitimacy concerns various audiences: macro (Magness, 2006), or general 
society or social groups, mezzo (Ogden and Clarke, 2005), or particular 
sectors/networks/organizations, and micro (Moll and Hoque, 2011), or individuals involved e.g. 
interacting with accounting. In the current study we analyse practices substantively at the mezzo 
level (university practices). 
In assessing the degree of legitimacy of a phenomenon/practice our work reflects preference 
for a bipolar continuum: conceptualizing degrees of legitimacy/illegitimacy on the same 
continuum. At a neutral crossover (between legitimacy and illegitimacy) one might, if 
measuring, score legitimacy and illegitimacy both at zero. The illegitimacy dimension begins 
with a given negative value denoting significant negative assessment (e.g. stigmatization or loss 
of right to function) and increases with diminishing controversy until the crossover (Elsbach, 
1994; Suddaby et al., 2017). This bipolar perspective contrasts with unipolar views that clearly 
struggle to theorize around a crossover point and simply theorize in terms of more or less 
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legitimacy.4 Use of bipolar scales usefully highlights GLIIHUHQFHVLQ OHJLWLPDF\¶VPHDQLQJLQ
various situations (Suchman, 1995) HJZKHQRUJDQL]DWLRQVH[SHFWRQO\µVLOHQW¶DFFHSWDQFH
from key external constituencies versus when they require more positive support and from other 
stakeholders too. Neutrality is lack of illegitimacy and may be consistent with silent acceptance 
but pRVLWLYHYDOXHVRQWKHFRQWLQXXPDUHFRQVLVWHQWZLWKVWDNHKROGHUV¶VXSSRUWIn the current 
study, the focus is on an organization seeking protection from illegitimacy risk: positive support 
from external constituencies is not sought, rather, negativity is to be avoided. 
As indicated in the introduction, we are substantively concerned to explore practices supporting 
strategic legitimacy in this study. Such practices may be under-researched vis-à-vis internal 
organizational practices due to access issues. Intentionally manipulating information, and 
selecting accounting methods influenced by social expectations, reflects concern to mobilize 
strategic legitimacy (Moll and Hoque, 2011).  
The neo-institutional approach especially facilitates better understanding of the interaction and 
tension between pro-effective and symbolic functions of accounting.5 Several studies (e.g. 
Townley, 2002; Ezzamel et al., 2012) show that legitimacy-seeking behaviours could partly 
diverge from economic rationality. In the context of varied approaches to securing legitimacy, 
researchers focus on two phenomena: isomorphism (Lounsbury, 2008) and legitimacy façade 
(Abrahamson and Baumard, 2009).  
Isomorphism involves adjusting to institutional environmental pressure that engenders 
similarity of action across various organizations (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008). DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) indicated three types of isomorphism: coercive, resulting from 
environmental dependence, normative, linked to professionalization, and mimetic, imitation of 
actions, especially those deemed successful. The logic of resemblance, imposing social 
pressures on organizations practising accounting in an institutional milieu, impacts diffusion 
and homogeneity of recording and calculation methods, reporting structures, information flow 
processes and the names used for solutions (Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006; Lounsbury, 2008; 
Messner et al., 2008; O'Neill et al., 2015). Isomorphism supports legitimacy in some contexts. 
Regarding contending logics, relative emphasis on legitimacy façade more likely manifests, 
reflected in the current study. 
Constructing a legitimacy façade concerns strategies to support legitimacy beyond 
isomorphism. Exploration of organizational reactions to institutional pressures has revealed 
several strategies: acquiesce, compromise, avoid, defy and manipulate (Oliver, 1991). Seeing 
DFFRXQWLQJDVDWRROLQWHJUDOWROHJLWLPDF\¶VDFWLYHFRQVWUXFWLRQKLJKSRWHQWLDOZDVGLVFRYHUHG
in manipulation strategies (Ogden and Clarke, 2005). The legitimacy constructed via 
manipulating symbols used by organizations in communication is aimed particularly at 
covering gaps between social expectations and organizational actions (Boxenbaum and 
Jonsson, 2008; Cho et al., 2015a). Manipulated symbols function in parallel to pro-effective 
practices, engendering decoupling in accounting, as Laine (2009) explored for external 
disclosure.  
The legitimacy façade is multi-layered (Abrahamson and Baumard, 2009), created through 
information usage at various levels. It can be integral to external disclosure creating or 
modifying organizational image but it can also be used internally. Most research (Laine, 2009; 
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 Suddaby et al. (2017) also elaborate the position where illegitimacy is conceptualized as a qualitatively different 
set of properties from legitimacy (Hudson, 2008).  
5
 µ3UR-HIIHFWLYH¶µIXQFWLRQDO¶GHQRWHVDWWDFKPHQWWRWKHHFRQRPLFORJLFRVWHQVLEO\SURPRWHGLQWKHPDUNHWUHIRUP
This may (as here) contrast with that legitimising a practice/function. This usage is similar to the earliy 
conceptualization of Meyer and Rowan (1977). 
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Cho et al., 2015a) has focused on external legitimacy façades, whereby organizations practice 
substantive impression or reputation management (Elsbach, 1994; Ogden and Clarke, 2005). 
While outcomes do not translate solely to legitimacy, but to other attributes like status, 
reputation and confidence-level (Townley, 2002; Johansson et al., 2016), manoeuvres across 
these are comparable.6 Among practices enacted by organizations to improve their appearance 
or image and cover for or displace attention from controversial aspects of their behaviour 
(Elsbach, 1994; Ogden and Clarke, 2005; Cho et al., 2015a) are information blocking, image 
manipulations involving deliberative data choices and providing/extending impactful 
disclosures. These practices may also resonate in the internal domain.7 
We stress that, despite its importance, existing research has scarcely addressed the internal 
legitimacy façade constructed within management accounting systems. Concerning the scope, 
complexity and dynamics of initiatives to change how internal managerial practices are applied, 
and FRQFHUQLQJ RUJDQL]DWLRQV¶ internal legitimising processes, researchers have mainly 
explored impacts of institutional milieu and external expectations (Abernethy and Chua, 1996; 
Townley, 2002; Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006; Rautiainen, 2010; Moll and Hoque, 2011; Goretzki 
et al., 2013; O'Neill et al., 2015; Wijethilake et al., 2017) but have scarcely attended to the 
detail of the internal legitmacy façade constructed within management accounting. 
There has been some research, insightful for the current study, on contradictory social pressures 
impacting upon internal information systems, e.g. focusing on divergent constituency 
expectations (Kurunmaki et al., 2003; Moll and Hoque, 2011; Chenhall et al., 2013), divergent 
logics of financial and non-financial goals (Carlsson-Wall et al., 2016) and different sources of 
institutional impact (Modell, 2003; Ezzamel et al., 2012). Such research helpfully indicates how 
internal accountings are used to engender compromise within organizations. Ezzamel et al. 
(2012) and Chenhall et al. (2013) uncover how organizational layers vis-à-vis accounting are 
linked and the dynamics thereof, recognizing efforts to ensure longer-term convergence among 
layers in the building of ties between these through compromises (others see the layers as able 
to function in parallel in relation to different logics, or as temporary, or as being selectively 
linked, see Lukka, 2007; Rautiainen, 2010). Decoupling is a core focus among phenomena 
observed vis-à-vis institutional milieu and internal impacts. It is here understood as the parallel 
functioning of RUJDQL]DWLRQDO µlayers¶ (encompassing elements, structures, methods and 
practices) reflecting different institutional logics, involving symbolic as well as pro-effective 
usages of management accounting. Decoupling is dynamic and manifest: for instance, in the 
layers of organizational methods and structures. 'HFRXSOLQJ¶VPDQLIHVWDWLRQ entails differences 
between formal management accounting rules and informal routines of preparing and using 
information (Carlsson-Wall et al., 2016).  
In conditions where logics are not only different but divergent (contradictory), interesting 
counter-coupling manoeuvres have been highlighted, reflected in the character and functioning 
of the layers: interconnected responses to divergent logics including counter orientations (as 
Cho et al., 2015a, elaborate in theorising external disclosures). Regarding legitimacy, 
interconnections concern the layer generating the legitimacy gap and the layer countering this 
or reducing its risk of exposure. Counter-FRXSOLQJ LV D NH\ HOHPHQW LQ %UXQVVRQ¶V 
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 An important research track reflects on crisis management and emergency reactions to illegitimacy risk, e.g. 
resulting from ecological catastrophes linked to organizational actions (Patten, 1992), press reactions to 
illegitimate actions (Elsbach, 1994), or financial scandals (Guénin-Paracini and Gendron, 2010).  
7
 Organizations may seek to alter external receiver perceptions of their communications, e.g. scapegoating others, 
including their own auditors, to buttress legitimacy threatened by controversies surrounding their actions (Guénin-
Paracini and Gendron, 2010).  
 
8 
 
organizational hypocrisy model, which explains legitimacy mechanisms of organizational 
functioning in unstable, complex and dynamic institutional environments. In counter-coupling, 
talk and decision are seen as used to compensate for action rather than to precede it in rational 
and consistent progression (Burrell Nickell and Roberts, 2014, p.218). Counter-coupling 
involves adjustment reactions to multiple institutional logics and their contradictions. Layers of 
talks, decisions and actions are intentionally in some ways kept divergent to permit fulfilment 
of the expectations of the different logics. Organizing hypocrisy (Burrell Nickell and Roberts, 
2014) requires efficient usage of every layer and skilful counter-coupling of manoeuvres in this 
context (Cho et al., 2015a) ,Q%UXQVVRQ¶VPRGHOPDQDJHPHQWDFFRXQWLQJFDQEHYLHZHGLQ
relation to a linked network of talks, decisions and actions performed connected to management 
accountiQJ¶V XVDJH Although Burrell Nickell and Roberts (2014) encourage its usage in 
relation to internal auditing, the model has scarcely been used in theorising management 
accounting and institutional pressures. Fernandez-Revuelta and Perez and Robson (1999) draw 
upon the model in relation to internal pressures impacting an organization. The internal 
information system can be seen as a type of talk by means of accounting language that 
distinctively links (involving contradictions) ZLWKPDQDJHUV¶GHFLVLRQVDQGDFWLRQV We shall 
see that contradictions can be built within management accounting. 
A tranche of existing management accounting research on legitimacy-seeking behaviour has 
principally focused on public organizations (Brignall and Modell, 2000; Rautiainen, 2010) and 
public-financed contracts (Johansson et al., 2016). The research is close to our focus and offers 
insights. The peculiar institutional milieu of public organizations (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 
1991; Ezzamel et al., 2012) impacts key socio-political dimensions of their actions vis-à-vis the 
economic dimension. The multitude and variety of constituencies here entails risks of highly 
dynamic and contradictory social pressures, shaping contending (Rautiainen, 2010) or 
competing (Townley, 2002; Ezzamel et al., 2012) legitimacies. A distinctiveness of this focus 
is the lack or absence of profit-orientation with nevertheless simultaneous usage of accounting 
methods applied to measure profit. Operations of state-owned enterprises in socialist countries 
have provided examples confirming decoupling and façade in management accounting, 
something to extend. Research RQ 3RODQG¶V transition àDGD-&LHĞODN and Kozarkiewicz-
Chlebowska, 2004) evidenced ceremonial accounting usage in such organizations before 
privatization.8 Also insightful is Normand and WoottRQ¶V  KLVWRULFDO study, which 
indicated that, in organizations that are public-funded or financed by voluntary contributions, 
financial reports served as instruments demonstrating to important stakeholders (including 
funders) that actions are performed properly, while also covering for data manipulation via, 
e.g., cost-shifting (see McGowan and Vendrzyk, 2002). 
A set of studies also near to our focus and suggesting insights has explored impacts on 
management accounting of constituencies deciding on funding from state budgets/public means 
(e.g., Abernethy and Chua, 1996). The legitimacy perceived by such financing units is key for 
organizations concerned to access resources for survival/development. Legitimacy is endowed 
based on perceptions of publicly financed organizational actions (e.g. regarding whether funds 
are used well and management is of good quality), and is shaped by accounting and knowledge 
about accounting used (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1991; Moll and Hoque, 2011). Moll and Hoque 
(2011) researched legitimacy accompanying university management accounting development, 
analysing impacts of expectations expressed by the institution financing an Australian 
XQLYHUVLW\RQWKHXQLYHUVLW\¶VGHFLVLRQWRLQWURGXFHDQHZEXGJHWLQJPHWKRG7KH\LGHQWLILHG
direct influences arising from seeking legitimacy in relation to key stakeholder views but also 
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 The cited study suggests that, e.g., profitability analysis and budgeting later began to play a more pro-effective 
role with privatization.  
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processes/practices aimed at convincing internal stakeholders about usage of the new method. 
Exploration of legitimising processes accompanying the change indicated the dynamic 
character of divergence between pursuits of university management and expectations of staff, 
important legitimacy agents. For Moll and Hoque (2011), linkage of contradictory external and 
internal expectations was possible due to loose coupling of internal and external accounting, 
the former including the new budgeting. 
The research referred to above, in seeking to theorise accounting and legitimacy in practice, 
contributes insight, as indicated, and we indeed refer back to such research in the main analysis. 
Yet, to emphasise, very little research has been done in respect of our specific focus - how 
management accounting has been used in response to illegitimacy risk due to contending 
institutional logics. And a particular gap is that studies on management accounting and 
legitimacy have scarcely focused on manipulation of internal information (Fernandez-Revuelta 
Perez and Robson, 1999, is an exception), contrasting with the more common detailed analyses 
of disclosure strategies (Ogden and Clarke, 2005; Cho et al., 2015a).  
More general research on accounting and legitimacy also has insight but is further away from 
our particular interests here. Studies in general scarcely explore practices supporting strategic 
legitimacy within organizations, perhaps due to access issues. There are few studies on the 
internal legitimacy façade and decoupling in relation thereto. Studies often eschew focus on 
unstable environments, contending logics and counter-coupling. And studies rarely focus on 
concern to protect from illegitimacy as opposed to creating/enhancing legitimacy. Reflection 
on the more general prior research on accounting and legitimacy suggests that corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosures are the main focus. Studies (see, e.g., Magness, 2006; Kent 
and Zunker, 2013; Cho et al., 2015a; Killian and O'Regan, 2016) have focused on the relation 
between scope and strategy of disclosures and social perceptions of and effectiveness of 
organizational actions /HJLWLPDF\¶V YHU\ importance in social/environmental accounting 
research has bolstered its status as a theoretical concept (Hoque, 2006; Cho and Patten, 2007; 
Archel et al., 2009). It is used to explain various disclosures in relation to social pressure (de 
Villiers and van Staden, 2006; Laine, 2009) and to uncover particular accounting applications 
(Hrasky, 2012; van Bommel, 2014). These points are also generally insightful for our analysis 
but clearly, for example, the scope and focus is different.9 This literature acknowledges that 
aspects or instances of disclosure can also threaten organizational legitimacy, e.g. when 
manipulation is discovered or promises broken (e.g. Elsbach, 1994; Gallhofer et al., 2006; 
Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008; see Breton and Cõté, 2006). This can translate internally. 
In summary, our framing, drawing from neo-institutionalism, reflects our appreciation of prior 
work. Legitimacy is substantively analysed as strategic. Organizational legitimacy as an 
attribute of, and at the level of, HE institutions is analysed through a fragmentary approach, 
focused on two logics of fee-charging. Institutional divergence in the logics of appropriate fee-
charging is seen as a source of social risk for the image and even the functioning of a university. 
Bipolar conceptualisation of legitimacy leads us to see lack of social agreement about charging 
as source of potential illegitimacy, shaping WKH XQLYHUVLW\¶V UHDFWLRQ in adapting internal 
accountings. Protection against illegitimacy risk here is oriented to gaining silent acceptance of 
the milieu and avoiding significant illegitimacy discount.  
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How the university reacted to illegitimacy risk is thus analysed, focusing on cost and fee 
calculations, management accounting practices. Relevant here are internal legitimacy façade 
and decoupling. We consider decoupling and counter-coupling in the context of contradictory 
institutional logics and uncover and identify interconnecting tactics involved in organizational 
reactions. We explore ceremonial as well as pro-effective usage of calculation methods and 
analyse impacts on decisions and actions. Decoupling and counter-coupling are considered 
along with the coherence (or incoherence) in the image of university performance constructed 
in financial reports used. We explore the detail of practices protecting illegitimacy risk arising. 
This aims to deepen appreciation of the internal legitimacy façade and decoupling in practice 
and indicate practices of counter-coupling in the case. Management accounting in our research 
LVFRQVLGHUHGLQWHJUDOWRIRUPDODQGLQIRUPDOµWDONV¶DWWKHXQLYHUVLW\LQUHODWLRQWRPDQDJHPHQW
decisions and actions. 
We have discussed prior work that we build upon in the current study. Concurrently, regarding 
our particular focus, we pointed to a research gap that we aim to diminish. Our research question 
is indicated as an issue in organizational and accounting theory. Yet seeking to explore this 
issue in detail has scarcely been attempted, partly due to access difficulties. To realize our aims, 
we need to pursue an approach that is in-depth interpretive, contextually informed and that 
mobilises an intense case study method yielding rich insights from the field. The next two 
sections provide a contextual analysis and outline the research method for the main case 
analysis. 
Contextual analysis 
Polish HE and rules governing financing of study programmes 
3RODQG¶VSRVW-1989 transition changed HE radically 5DF]\ĔVND. The sector had been 
solely public-financed. HE was via 5-year full-time masters offered free to the selected elite of 
secondary school graduates. Along with accompanying scientific, political and social activities, 
it was assigned to state-run institutions seen as state agents with little autonomy. During 
transition, it was taken for granted that HE would need to change and in line therewith new 
rules reflecting market mechanisms were gradually introduced. Initially, changes were oriented 
mostly to improving accessibility to HE and to decentralising management. The recognizable 
effect of these early changes (CSO report10) included radical student number increases, dynamic 
development of non-public HE institutions and augmentation ostensibly of public universities¶
autonomy. Later, IROORZLQJ3RODQG¶V LQWHJUDWLRQ ZLWK WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ (EU), Polish HE 
changes were oriented to convergence with Bologna processes. 
During the focal period, public (and non-public) HE institutions offered (LHE11) degree 
programmes of four major types each with a particular required number of European Credit 
Transfer System (ECTS) points: first-cycle baccalaureate or engineering programmes (3-3.5 
years), second-cycle master programmes (1.5-2 years); third-cycle doctoral programmes (4 
years); additionally, non-degree postgraduate programmes. The first- to third-cycle 
programmes were offered full-time, financed by state budget grants, and part-time (evening 
DQGRUZHHNHQGILQDQFHGE\VWXGHQWV¶IHHV1RQ-degree postgraduate programmes, offering 
new skills to professionals, were fee-charging and only offered part-time. 
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With increased access to HE and growing intra-institutional competition, financing underwent 
significant change (EU report12). State budget grant allocations to institutions were determined 
by a specific algorithm considering DVDPDMRUIDFWRUWKHLQVWLWXWLRQ¶VSRVLWLRQDPRQJRWKHUV
mostly established by student numbers, inducing HE institutions to increase these and compete 
for candidates. Further, the fees level was important. Fees created an important revenue source 
arising from market-oriented efforts of management and staff. The breadth of changes reflecting 
market mechanisms engendered the model of public HE denoted by the phrase 6XáNRZVNLand 
Seliga, 2016) µHQWUHSUHQHXULDOXQLYHUVLW\¶supra).  
A demographic peak manifested in Poland after 2004 with a huge increase in part-time students, 
who decided to undertake degree-level study now more accessible to them (CSO report, supra). 
This gave HE institutions opportunities for revenue growth and development. However, 
demographic forecasts and predicted decline in candidate numbers post-2014 MHRSDUGLVHG+(¶V
financial stability. By the time of our research, institutions expected fewer candidates for both 
full-time and part-time programmes, having to compete even more intensely. 
The structure of financing HE institutions, expansion RIIXQGVFUHDWHGE\VWXGHQWV¶IHHVDQGWKH
µHQWUHSUHQHXULDOXQLYHUVLW\¶PRGHOZHre, however, socially controversial. Forms of equal, free 
and common access to HE were enshrined in the Polish Constitution. By Article 70(2):  
Education in public schools shall be without payment. Statutes may allow«payments for 
certain services provided by public institutions«>+(@.  
Regarding charges, rules impacting autonomy were introduced. Article 99(1) of the LHE, 
27/7/2005 (amended 2016) declared: A public«>+(@«institution may charge fees 
for«educational services related to: 1) teaching«part-time students and part-time doctoral 
students«1a) teaching«full-time students following a second or consecutive full-time degree 
programme«1b) teaching«full-time students attending courses falling outside the ECTS 
limit«2) repetition of specific courses within full-time degree and«doctoral programmes 
resulting from unsatisfactory learning outcomes«3) provision of programmes in a foreign 
language«4) provision of courses not included in a«programme«5) provision of non-degree 
postgraduate programmes and extensions. Fees are determined by institutions¶ rectors provided 
they (Article 99(2)): may not be greater than«costs incurred in introducing and delivering 
respectively the degree or doctoral programmes referred to in section 1«by a 
given«>+(@«institution, nor the cost of courses provided within degree and doctoral 
programmes referred to in section 1(2), including costs of development and implementation of 
a given institutional strategic development plan, in particular academic staff development, as 
well as development of teaching and research infrastructure including renovation and 
depreciation«. The paragraph later states that detailed fee-charging rules are decided by 
institutions¶ senates. Similar rules on cost-based fee determination concerned non-public 
institutions. Other paragraphs established rules for fixing other charges based on planned or 
actual cost. 
Additional key regulations concerned programme financing. 7KH 0LQLVWU\¶V RUGLQDQFH 
contained rules for dividing funds designated in the state budget among public and non-public 
HE institutions. Generally, the rule used to allocate public funds among HE institutions was 
based on combining data about all Polish institutions into one algorithm. Given this, all 
institutions competed to gain from this common pool as much funding as possible. Per the 
formula, each insWLWXWLRQ¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQGHSHQGHG upon such factors as student numbers, the 
programme cost-absorption index, the number and quality of academic staff, research projects 
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assigned, scientific categorisation and internationalization indicators. There were some 
provisions aimed at assuring stability, e.g. a proportion (currently 50%) of funds allocated to 
an institution was based on its prior year share and change on the previous year could not be 
higher than +/-5% of the prior total. In overall detail the allocation formula was very 
complicated, being set out over 28 pages of the legal document. The formula and its parameters 
had often changed and were contingent upon the type of HE institution (e.g. non-public, public, 
medical, military). 
In the regulations, support for full-time (not fee-charging) degree programmes was conditioned 
by a so-FDOOHGµVWXGHQW-GRFWRUDOVWXGHQWLQGLFDWRU¶, for most public HE institutions, as high as 
40% of their state budget allocations during our fieldwork. This indicator was also calculated 
by a very complicated formula. It contained data about student numbers corrected by a cost-
absorption index related to programmes and determined funds allocated per student of specific 
programmes. Further, it was periodically constructed and presented by the Ministry in separate 
regulations. Additionally, the indicator reflected an index of staff accessibility based on student 
numbers divided by academic (teaching) staff numbers. In institutions where the accessibility 
index waV DERYH WDUJHW  LQ  WKH µVWXGHnt-doctoral student LQGLFDWRU¶ ZDs reduced 
significantly: this penalty for low accessibility to teachers was computed as the quotient of 
target to actual student numbers squared. Of note, actual student numbers in this formula 
included all students from first- to third-cycle studies, including part-time. Following this rule, 
the large number of students participating in part-time programmes (fee-charging) affected 
indirectly this penalty, lowering drastically State subsidies.  
Legal regulations reflected GLYHUJHQWH[SHFWDWLRQVRI+(LQVWLWXWLRQV¶SHUIRUPDQFHSDUWLFXODUO\
pertaining to public HE institutions. Entrepreneurial expectations implied active quests to 
improve finances by exploring additional funding sources. Yet, regulations also introduced a 
peculiar system of penalties for institutions performing effectively in running fee-charging 
degree and non-degree programmes with a high number of students per academic staff member. 
Further, if sectoral competition and institutional autonomy were ostensibly promoted, 
regulations limited the freedom to fees-setting not exceeding programme cost. This cost-
oriented rationale for charging students impacted Ministry allocations of diverse public funds 
to various full-time programmes (which also charged for added elements like resits). The 
regulations suggested HE could be offered only unprofitably (not-for-profit), showing zero 
profit as maximum.  
If the regulations did not require disclosures of detailed calculations of fees, or penalties in the 
case of deviations, they constituted strong external pressure influencing internal accounting. 
This pressure connected with the search for legitimising study charges in circumstances when 
charging was common but socially controversial. Controversy concerned particularly charges 
paid by full-time students, who needed to pay something at the recruitment stage and/or for 
course repetition, and charges paid by fee-paying part-time students. 
Research method: focused case analysis 
Reflecting our research concerns, we followed a case study method, facilitating exploration of 
internal practices of programme cost and fee calculations taking into account complex 
deliberations and dynamics of the institutional milieu (Hoque, 2006). Our method aided access 
to the detail of practices. The period analysed was 2012-16, i.e. after the significant 2011 reform 
of Polish HE13 until 2016 (when the main study was conducted). The 2011 reform, effect and 
source of institutional transition, brought system modifications connected, inter alia, with the 
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new regulations allowing public HE institutions more fee-charging options. The reform process 
ignited debates, given anticipated deep changes, reflecting social controversy over public HE¶V
role. This lowered WKH +( VHFWRU¶V institutional stability, a trend enhanced by demographic 
changes shaping student demand during the period. Increased competition and radically lower 
financial stability propelled institutional authorities towards efficiency-oriented management. 
Polish HE institutions struggled to link concern to maintain financial stability with reaction 
deemed appropriate given institutional pressures. 
Research was conducted in a large Polish university anonymised as Alpha Public University 
(AlphaPU). It was (and remains) one of the biggest of such institutions successfully linking HE 
with high levels of scientific research. Particular factors motivated our choice. First, AlphaPU 
offered educational services/programmes of all cycles/types: full-time and part-time (fee-
charging), degree and non-degree, with variety in cost-absorption indexes (1.5 to 3). Despite 
external challenges, AlphaPU boasted growth, extensive assets, organizational stability and a 
long-held positive financial position, seemingly confirming the instLWXWLRQ¶V MXGLFLRXV
adjustability to changeable conditions. Its persistence in introducing new organizational and 
financial solutions had bolstered its image, including as early adapter of the changes enforced 
by law, governmental agencies and accreditation bodies. These attributes seemed to confirm an 
ability to link academic success with responsiveness to institutional pressures.  
Additional key features of AlphaPU justified its choice: its decentralized management and 
substantial management accounting system. In Alpha38¶V VWUXFWXUH WKHUH ZHre primary 
academic units (faculties, treated as profit centres), and supporting units (some profit, some 
cost, some mixed profit-cost and even one investment centre). Degree and non-degree 
programmes were offered by faculties per unified internal rules. Fees for first- to third-cycle 
studies were set officially by the rector, who received proposed fees from faculty authorities. 
Each faculty Dean oversaw revenues/costs of faculty offerings. For non-degree postgraduate 
programmes, the system was more complex. Financial responsibility was at three levels: 
decisions on charges and cost were first taken by programme managers, next agreed by faculty 
and then by university authorities. The PRVW LPSRUWDQW FRPSRQHQWV RI WKH XQLYHUVLW\¶s 
management accounting system were internal revenue and cost records for each unit together 
with a very complex system of internal calculations. The latter included the special algorithm 
of Alpha38¶V SXEOLF IXQGs allocation, systems for calculating indirect costs and costs of 
obligatory internal services, and (reciprocal) calculations of revenues and costs of non-
obligatory cooperation.14 Recorded and allocated revenues and costs were reported regularly in 
unit segment reports, forming unit budgets integrated with planning data. Budgets were 
prepared initially in faculties and next consolidated at university level and sent to the Ministry 
as an official financial plan. Budgets were corrected during performance and, with segment 
reports, weUHNH\ WRROV IRUPRQLWRULQJHDFKXQLW¶V ILQDQFes. The university and each faculty 
prepared a broad range of periodical diagnostic and decision analyses, including of fees and 
costs. Conscious development of management accounting was in evidence. 
We used several methods appropriate to case analysis. We initially reviewed formal internal 
reports comprising information on costs and fees, and internal regulations guiding their 
preparation (Table 1). We sought explanations needed to understand and learn about formulas 
for calculating particular figures. We also sought to understand relevant information flows in 
the organization and to find out who was responsible for preparing information in the focal 
faculty and who used it. We constantly sought confirmation that units had the same obligations 
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or used similar reporting systems. Intentionally, we initially limited analyses to information in 
formal reports transmitted from faculty to university level.  
Table 1. Research materials: regulations and documents 
Regulations and statistics  
Polish HE Constitution of the Republic of Poland 
LHE (2005, supra) 
Minister of Science and HE regulations for dividing state budget 
subsidies for public and non-public HE institutions (2012-16) 
EU Report 2014 (supra) 
&HQWUDO6WDWLVWLFDO2IILFH+(LQVWLWXWLRQV¶GDWDhttp://stat.gov.pl) 
CSO Report 2015 (supra) 
Internal documents of AlphaPU (2012-2016) 
Financial reports Fee calculations for non-degree postgraduate programmes 
Fee calculations, added elements (first- and second-cycle studies) 
Fee calculations for doctoral programmes 
Final settlements of non-degree postgraduate programmes 
Settlements of first- to third-cycle programmes 
Annual settlements of non-degree postgraduate programmes 
Annual faculty budgets 
0RQWKO\UHSRUWVRIIDFXOWLHV¶UHVXOWV 
Reports and information on internal settlements 
Information on state budget fund allocations to faculties 
Internal regulations University Statute 
New programme creation rules   
Senate resolutions on the University budget 
5HFWRU¶VRUGLQDQFHFRQFHUQLQJLQWHUQDOVHWWOHPHQWV 
5HFWRU¶VRUGLQDQFHRQ8QLYHUVLW\DFFRXQWLQJUHJXODWLRQV 
 
The second method for garnering research material was participatory observation. We 
participated in preparing information for internal reports and in meetings when the information 
was presented or analysed (Table 2). Actual preparation and use of internal data were observed.  
Table 2. Research materials: participation in meetings 
Participation in meetings at AlphaPU (2012-2016) 
Meeting level Topic Frequency/number of meetings 
participated in/observed 
Faculty  Creating new first- to third-cycle 
programmes; fee-setting 
Ad Hoc meetings focused on 
particular matters. Meeting 
organized when new programmes 
were introduced/1 meeting 
Annual fee-setting for first- to 
third-cycle programmes 
Regular meetings organized once a 
year, brief discussions if no 
important changes introduced/4 
meetings 
Annual fee-setting for non-degree 
postgraduate programmes 
Regular meetings organized once a 
year/4 meetings 
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Committee approval of new non-
degree postgraduate programmes  
Ad Hoc, focused meetings organized 
when new programmes were 
introduced/2 meetings 
Committee approval of the annual 
budget 
Regular meetings of considerable 
duration organized once a year/4 
meetings 
Discussions on faculty 
development strategy  
Ad Hoc, focused meetings of 
considerable duration/6 meetings 
University  Developing electives and rules for 
their financial settlement 
Regular meetings/4 meetings 
New regulations for charging for 
added elements of studies 
Ad Hoc, focused meetings/1 meeting 
Discussions on teaching costs and 
settlement rules 
Ad Hoc, focused meetings/4 
meetings 
Introducing internal settlement 
rules for third-cycle programmes 
Ad Hoc, focused meetings/1 meeting 
 
A key aspect of the framing brought to participant observation was the distinction between pro-
effective and µFHUHPRQLDO¶XVDJH of reports. Participant observation facilitated gathering data 
on reporting changes. During the period when the changes occurred we used in effect a third 
method: discussions with those engaged with the changes, seeking to locate differences of 
opinion between internal actors over the changes. The strictest anonymity was insisted upon by 
those with whom we engaged in discussion and we report findings accordingly. To enhance 
results, we mobilised a triangulation strategy, seeking that each research component (document 
analysis, participant observation, discussion) be verified by the next and confirmed by 
additional evidence. Findings were discussed by all authors and in case of controversy followed 
up in later stages of the research.  
The formulated tactics so prominent in our case were uncovered through repeated coding of 
collected research material. It is worth elaborating upon this here to express the strength of our 
method in this respect. First, financial reports related directly or indirectly to fee-charging were 
identified and grouped into ten main categories. Next, methods of preparation and usage of 
information in these reports were analysed and deemed pro-effective or ceremonial, depending 
on functional or symbolic use. Then, the degree of involvement of managerial and 
administrative staff was analysed. Next, it was determined whether individual reports were 
formally required for use or were used informally. We also checked whether reports were 
archived for future potential use or not. The coding stage prior to formulating the tactics 
consisted in delineating perceived ways of manipulating information in reports: adding or 
hiding methods; labelling; manipulating formulas; structuring/representing, as well as altering 
the value or accuracy of, data. 
16 
 
 
 Figure 1 Structure of the coding logic 
A synthetic summary of the coding, reflecting our appreciation of prior work and insights 
garnered from on-going fieldwork, is presented in Figure 1. Ultimately, adopted coding criteria 
included: decoupling layers (symbolic and functional); formal or informal practices; 
manipulation mode. This yielded the suggested four tactics. Formal methods used symbolically 
to establish convergence of fees and costs were grouped as ceremonial calculations. Detected 
manoeuvres implicating labels describing accounting items in reports were termed legitimacy 
labelling. Manipulations of formulas or structuring/representation of data, aimed at hindering 
verification of figures in reports, were delineated as blackboxing. A last group of informal pro-
effective methods used by managers was named shadow management accounting. Identified 
tactics were linked in interaction to cost and market logics, engendering the counter-coupling 
proposition. 
A focused case study analysis and discussion 
We initially structure our case analysis below around the adaptation tactics uncovered in our 
research, in part inspired by prior work. We found four tactics used in management accounting 
as responses to the divergent institutional pressures. First, we highlight ceremonial calculations, 
which constructed a legitimacy façade. Next, we discuss legitimacy labHOOLQJDQGµEODFNER[LQJ¶ 
manoeuvres. We then expound upon shadow management accounting. Below, each tactic is 
elaborated, confirmed in practice, and linked to our theoretical constructs. After discussing each 
tactic with appreciation of prior research, we elaborate impacts upon management accounting.  
Having thus delineated each tactic, we then theorise more explicitly relationships between them. 
We elaborate further the relationship between ceremonial calculation and shadow management 
accounting. While ceremonial calculation constructed an internal legitimacy façade, shadow 
management accounting sought to maintain internal accounting¶V pro-effective role, forming 
two organizational layers. We elaborate how legitimacy labelling and blackboxing helped bind 
these layers. Appreciating the interconnecting functioning of all the tactics, we highlight 
counter-coupling observed in the case.  
Ceremonial calculation 
The main management accounting tactic used to confirm convergence between actions taken 
by AlphaPU and legally-shaped expectation was application of particular cost calculations 
when establishing charges (fees). Calculations proposing charges were prepared bottom-up and 
transmitted to various committees at faculty and university levels, with final acceptance of 
charges announced by the uQLYHUVLW\¶V rector. Analysis of the content of relevant documents 
and exploration of calculation methods used (and how they were used), indicated that these 
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reports had foremost a ceremonial role, confirming formally that, for programmes, charges 
aligned with costs. Decisions and actions involved in setting charges followed a logic different 
from ceremonial confirmation. Ceremonial construction of internal accountings aimed at 
portraying programme charges as appropriate applied to all student payment types.  
Divergence between the actual underlying logic of charging and its symbolic reflection in 
management accounting was particularly apparent with non-degree postgraduate programmes. 
The latter were offered to professionals and partly reflected entrepreneurialism of some 
university staff (mainly professors effectively assuming business manager roles) seeking extra 
income.  
Reflecting WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VIOH[LEOHfunctioning, most non-degree postgraduate programme 
µGLUHFW FRVWV¶ ZHre variable. Fixed costs connected with infrastructure use were calculated 
separately as overheads. Indirect cost was added as a percentage of direct, standardised in 
specific periods (mostly at 40%, with 60% as permitted maximum). Calculations aligning 
charges and costs had to be displayed on programme creation and each year/semester at 
programme commencement. Besides charges and costs, information prepared had to contain 
data on planned student numbers, teaching hours and rates per teaching hour.  
Observations of managers setting fees at programme creation, concerning logic accepted and 
behaviour, confirmed usage of market mechanisms. The starting point was analysis of charges 
for similar programmes at competing HE institutions and other fee-charging programmes at 
AlphaPU. Next, market price was adjusted reflecting the uniYHUVLW\¶VSRVLWLRQFRPSHWition and 
observed/expected student applications. Calculations here were made by managers quite 
informally. Even if pricing was done in a fragmented way, the general strategy was coherent, 
oriented towards revenue maximisation. After pricing, managers adjusted programme content 
and calculated planned costs. The final stage was the key ceremonial calculation related to 
balancing numbers, substantively so that cost equalled UHYHQXH*LYHQYDULDEOHFRVWV¶VKDUHRI
costs, balancing was easiest by manipulating student numbers. 
A high similarity in non-degree postgraduate programme fees was observed across 
programmes, apparently reflecting internal isomorphism in manager decisions. Our experience 
from participation in committees assessing programmes suggested that, when managers decided 
to set fees similar to fees of other offerings, this facilitated programme acceptance/initiation. 
All stakeholders engaged in programme creation were convinced that numbers in calculations 
at that stage would not actually be achieved. From our research, calculations required formally 
at programme initiation were never subsequently used. 
The similar calculation expected when non-degree postgraduate programmes started each 
year/semester were an opportunity to change fees chosen at programme initiation. This 
FDOFXODWLRQ¶V ceremonial character was partly evidenced in its being prepared pre-enrolment. 
Costs had to be determined by managers when actual student numbers were unknown. The 
calculation could only confirm and authorise programme fee changes. From our observations, 
each year programme managers tended to provide the same calculations modified slightly by 
expected student numbers. Modification was needed to balance cost and revenue, the first 
condition for launching programmes. Actual data were not monitored during the year. Cost 
calculations were corrected at year end when balancing had to occur. Programme settlement 
required a zero balance: small surpluses were transferrable to next programme runs; with 
deficits, overheads were lowered. 
Turning from non-degree postgraduate programmes, a similar approach was used to legitimise 
part-time degree fees. An additional obstacle (or opportunity) in preparing calculations for these 
programmes related to major teaching costs being shared between full-time (free) and part-time 
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(fee-charging) programmes. Calculations were thereby more complicated and even more 
detached from actual manager decisions. Flexibility in balancing revenue and cost was aided 
by overhead rate manipulation.  
The common and persistent challenge in all programme calculations explored was to 
demonstrate that planned costs confirmed fee levels. Following decoupling in internal 
information systems, responsibilities for calculations were assigned to administrators. In 
general, programme and faculty managers did not input into these cost reports, being convinced 
by, or not challenging, the ceremonial. Reports were here not to exhibit attention-directing 
controversial information but to balance the figures and satisfy the accounting department. Only 
secondly were they to reflect programme manager plans.  
Participant observation illuminated further evidence of ceremonial calculation. This arose in 
meetings concerning introducing new charges for additional items like student course 
repetitions. Meetings were devoted to calculations prepared by each faculty, each free to 
determine fees and only needing to clarify expected costs. After faculty representative 
presentations, it seemed charges for exactly the same component (e.g. one ECTS, one hour) 
were significantly different (by as much as a factor of 10). Efforts to explain differences yielded 
arguments about differing faculty financial situations. There were also arguments about the 
scope of costs considered/specified in calculations: the faculty submitting the lowest charge 
only took marginal cost into consideration; the faculty with the highest considered costs 
expansively. Interestingly, after debate lacking reference to pro-effective calculation, the 
chairperson decided that discrepancies must be reduced: faculties were advised to utilise new 
charges congruous with the most commonly submitted charges and then prepare calculations. 
If in practice costs were diverse, all faculty charges thus converged (to almost the same in some 
faculties).  
Identified standardised cost and fee calculations were consistent with creation of a legitimacy 
façade via introducing symbols (reports) confirming expected congruence between fees and 
costs. In AlphaPU, widening management accounting, involving additional ceremonial 
calculations, reflected coercive institutional pressure. And it was difficult to accomplish. 
Calculations helped legitimise fees given expressed readiness internally to meet expectations 
regarding their compatibility with cost. Methods applied reflected preparedness in relation to 
risks of attracting critical attention from external constituencies (e.g. monitoring agencies). In 
interactions with its environment, the university sought lower illegitimacy risk, reflected in 
absence of disclosures of detailed content in cost reports that might draw external stakeholder 
attention. The internal legitimacy façade constructed was related to management accounting yet 
paradoxically protected against illegitimacy risk arising mainly externally. Noteworthy is that 
ceremonial calculations followed an isomorphism in the determining of study charges. 
Intentional manipulation of numbers covered for actual aims of aligning costs with charges 
facilitating avoidance of internal and external controversies.  
We can summarise the above aspects of our case by clarifying the construct ceremonial 
calculation and succinctly elaborating its implication for management accounting. Ceremonial 
calculation here equated to using management accounting methods to construct a legitimacy 
façade (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008). Our findings support prior research (Fernandez-
Revuelta Perez and Robson, 1999; Rautiainen, 2010; Moll and Hoque, 2011) in suggesting that 
the legitimacy gap can be compensated for by strategic usage of management accounting. 
Ceremonial calculations served defensively against possible external or internal questioning of 
the RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶Vfee-charging in the context of contradictory logics.  
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Ceremonial calculations engendered particular effects in terms of DFFRXQWLQJ¶V pro-
effectiveness. It reduced transparency of actual decision-making criteria used in developing 
teaching offerings. It especially detached these criteria from DFWLYLWLHV¶ costs. It facilitated kinds 
RIµLQWXLWLYH¶DQGFROOHFWLYHO\-negotiated decision-making (substantively detached from costs 
and revenues) at various levels of the university in fees-setting. Decisions then made did impact 
on actual study costs. These processes translated into short-term orientation of managers 
escaping more substantive and future-oriented financial discipline. Relatedly, the possibility of 
formally using other financial analyses, especially strategic, e.g. when creating new offerings, 
was obstructed. The conviction of most staff (academic and administrative) was strengthened 
of the dominant externally shaped DFFRXQWLQJUROHDQGDFFRXQWLQJ¶V relatively limited serving 
of pro-effectiveness. 
Legitimacy labelling 
The second identified tactic for legitimising fees was usage of ceremonial labels as substitutes 
for more pro-effective accounting terms/categories. This was creative, involving usage of labels 
describing information content: terms like profit/margin/revenue were replaced with other 
labels suggesting formal reference to the more leJLWLPDWHµFRVW¶7KLVUKHWRULFZDs not restricted 
to ceremonial instruments of calculations confirming fee levels. It was more pervasive. 
Manoeuvres were deployed regarding legal regulations concerning authorised allocation of 
different state budget grants to different programmes. Cost rhetoric used continued earlier cost 
rhetoric dominant prior to market-oriented reform (àada, 2015). Legal regulations introducing 
the µFRVW¶ formula of financing helped legitimise such practice. 
Earlier in our focal period, AlphaPU fees were articulated by the basic formula revenue equals 
direct cost extended by overheads. Formal calculations made no reference to profit/margin. 
Study programmes were not to be taken as sources of surplus/deficit. There was officially no 
expected possibility of difference between revenue and cost. Observation of calculative practice 
indicated that overheads were de facto depositories of programme margins. Such margins 
engendered tension between headquarters, faculty and in relation to non-degree post-graduate 
programmes, also programme managers. The indirect cost labelling used provided very 
VHUYLFHDEOHµFRDWLQJ¶covering actual organizational ways of allocating surpluses/deficits.  
An apparently more realistic costing/charging method was introduced in a changed report form 
in the last year of our focal period. The new form started with direct extended by indirect cost 
by DVHWSHUFHQWDJHQRWDUDQJHRISRVVLELOLWLHVWRJLYHµQHWFRVW¶, raised by any value added 
tax and a profit element (a percentage of a direct costs component of internal services costs). 
The method was internally understood but yielded a figure likely understating profit/margin, 
with amounts disappearing in indirect costs, hidden on the form. Revenue was here explicit but 
HTXDWHGWRµJURVVFRVW¶ (the IRUP¶Vearlier version contained QRH[SOLFLWKHDGLQJµUHYHQXH¶ as 
µJURVVFRVW¶UHSUHVHQWHGUHYHQXH). The approach functioned as a mechanism of dual façade in 
cost labelling. 7KH ODEHO µLQGLUHFWFRVW¶FRYHUHG programme margin µ*URVVFRVW¶HTXDWHG to 
revenue and hid profit.  
The calculation approach used in ceremonial planning reports was used in the forms presenting 
actual programme results. µ0RQLWRULQJ¶UHSRUts (focused on actual results) were prepared at the 
calendar year end (three months after the academic year began), accompanied by duly corrected 
plans for the next year. Subsequent reporting was at the programme cycle end. Calculations (of 
actuals) then had to align revenues with costs. Programmes had to be settled with zero balance. 
Observations indicated that manoeuvres thus next allocated surplus or deficit. One practice was 
transferring surplus to the next programme run, if the scope of this was constrained by informal 
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internal regulations. Compatibility of programme revenue and cost was achieved by regularly 
correcting plans when reporting actual results. 
The accounting tools used were seen by VWDIIDV µQDWXUDO¶DQGµVDIH¶VROXWLRQV OLQNHGWR WKH
DFFRXQWLQJ GHSDUWPHQW¶V SUDFWLFHV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK PDQDJHPHQW UHSRUWV 7KH\ VHUYHd to 
confirm that calculations, formally, were correctly prepared. The accountings were thus seen to 
permiW µIDLU¶FKDUJHVDQGdemonstrate that actual charges covered costs. The search to unify 
pro-effective and symbolic in one coherent accounting system required compromise. The first 
set of proposed new calculations, displacing µrevenue¶ by XVLQJ µJURVV FRVW¶ supra), met 
protests from staff responsible for calculations who felt the information confusing and 
inadequate. Subsequently, the report included the revenue heading. Yet revenue still equalled 
gross cost and was scarcely highlighted. 
Another example of legitimacy labelling was usage of indicators differentiating levels of state 
budget grants covering costs of full-time (free) programmes, which suggested certain 
programmes had higher costs than others. However, analysis RIUHFHQW\HDUV¶ programme costs, 
charges for added elements and fees paid by part-time students strongly suggested that this 
GLIIHUHQWLDWLRQFRQVWLWXWHGDµUDWLRQDOLVHGP\WK¶0H\HUDQG5RZDQ9DQ%RPPHO
The myth was created by the Polish Ministry for HE, seeking to justify differing grant levels to 
various programmes. AlphaPU transmitted this rhetoric to internal management accounting. 
Cost-absorption indicators helped allocate budget grants among faculties and were connected 
neither with actual nor planned costs. In the focal period, direct costs of various programmes 
were diverse but not so much as the indicators (1.5-3.0) suggested. All programmes had the 
same or very similar requirements as to ECTS numbers, contact hours per ECTS, staff 
remuneration rates, and even expected student numbers per lecturer. The only substantive 
source of direct cost diversity was average student group size, affected by 
recruitment/enrolment success and common group size arrangements. Another factor 
engendering similarity in operation costs was the slightness of differences in charges for 
selected elements of full-time and part-time studies. Analysis confirmed that cost-absorption 
was a term used figuratively (symbolically) to legitimise diversity in financing from budget 
funds. Yet, given financing methods, faculties with higher revenues from state budget grants 
did allocate their monies: they could justify a higher figure for total cost per student.  
Observations at management meetings and through our active participation in reporting 
processes indicated that legitimising usage of ceremonial cost labels affected communication, 
creating barriers (in both examples, if more marked in the second case).  Avoiding terms like 
revenue/margin/profit, and their replacement or substitution by various cost terms/categories, 
engendered misunderstandings. The situation permitted/encouraged freedom in usage of the 
notions/concepts linked to rhetorical objectives, evident in many discussions conducted at 
AlphaPU meetings where there were debates on fee levels, planned and actual revenue, margin 
distribution, programme effectiveness, and even programme quality. E.g., a disputant 
discussing quality improvement argued that programmes with higher cost-absorption indicators 
RIIHUHGEHWWHUµTXDOLW\¶DQGSURJUDPPHVZLWKORZLQGLFDWRUVZHUHRIUHODWLYHO\SRRUµTXDOLW\¶
implying that the university, if seeking a better ranking, should not invest in programmes with 
lower cost-absorption. At one meeting a manager argued that increasing cost automatically led 
to obtaining higher budget funds and thus quality improvement, so that increasing programme 
costs should be regarded as the main aim of all university managers!  
Observation suggested that the manifest practices were accepted relatively smoothly where 
participants in meetings were relatively experienced as well as proficient: acceptance of the 
hypocrisy here related to ceremonial accounting usage. Questioning the practices usually was 
negatively received. There was even an often expressed willingness to reject challenges, 
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chDUDFWHULVHG DV µIURP LQWUXGHUV¶. Concurrently, in unofficial discussions outside formal 
meetings, some committee members opined that µinadequate¶ ceremonial accounting notions 
should be supressed and pro-effective language employed more, if alongside the 
symbolic/ceremonial given the ODWWHU¶VµDFFHSWDELOLW\¶in on-going processes.  
Legitimacy labelling facilitated apparent congruence of costs and revenues, displacing 
controversial questions about possible surpluses/deficits of selected programmes. In the 
ceremonial ways articulated, legitimacy of charges DVµDSSURSULDWH¶was buttressed. Cover for 
differences in SURJUDPPHV¶effectiveness was secured. Translation of a rhetoric of legitimacy 
to accounting methods/concepts was seen as how to diminish illegitimacy risk. Usage of 
ceremonial accounting-type descriptions in reports legitimised these reports as reflecting 
compatibility with generally accepted accounting principles. The tactic reflected the influence 
of rhetoric of university supervision agencies and met official institutional expectations. The 
legitimacy manoeuvres negatively impacted pro-effective behaviour and information that might 
foster the latter. E.g., the limited accountability in practice of particular university segments 
(e.g. non-degree post-graduate programmes) engendered decision-making problems. 
Organizational hypocrisy was fostered. Development of further monitoring mechanisms to 
enable protection and consolidation of internal legitimacy for the constructed façade was 
subsequently required. 
Summarising, legitimacy labelling reflects how the rhetoric of an institutional logic, here the 
cost logic, can be transmitted to the ostensibly functional accounting/management reports. This 
exemplifies manipulation of activity descriptions (Ogden and Clarke, 2005) through 
choice/application of accounting methods (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1991). Altering labels 
referring to general accounting terms/categories to other labels constrained to converge with 
the cost logic constituted manoeuvres to protect legitimacy. Cost labelling is a convenient 
coating for surplus/deficit shifting observed in universities (Moll and Hoque, 2011) and other 
publicly financed organizations (McGowan and Vendrzyk, 2002). 
Manipulation through labelling in reports and transferring a cost-oriented rhetoric to 
management discussions constructed communication barriers hampering effective control of 
programmes, especially since typically academic managers had limited knowledge and 
experience in management accounting. At the planning stage, managers scarcely attended to 
the financial information, with financial plans being subject to later adjustments to increase 
their feasibility. This hampered concern to ensure that managers account for financial effects 
of their decisions and VHJPHQWV¶ analysis: it was also a convenient façade for concealing 
shortfalls/surpluses of individual segments. 
Blackboxing 
The next tactic identified in Alpha38¶V PDQDJHPHQW DFFRXQWLQJ ZH term blackboxing. It 
consisted in usage of such complicated methods as to make it almost impossible to assess the 
fairness of calculation formulas and trustworthiness of accrued data.15 Blackboxing was 
substantively used for calculations and settlements of first- to third-cycles of studies with a 
common cost termed direct cost. Direct cost could be based on teaching hours and be thus 
allocated to full-time and part-time programmes. Concurrently, teaching costs more generally 
were the subject of complex individual and summary intra-faculty settlements. Another area 
lacking in transparency was the state budget funds allocation algorithm. As with the cost-
absorption indicators, the university worked with a complex Ministry-shaped formula received 
                                                          
15
 7RWKRVHZRUNLQJZLWKWKHV\VWHPWKHVHDVSHFWVRIWKHV\VWHPDUHUHQGHUHGDµEODFNER[¶ 
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from the Ministry that was meant to direct allocation. The money was allocated within the 
university in a complex way. 
In AlphaPU¶V case, blackboxing is well illustrated by usage of a special Excel spreadsheet to 
calculate costs of first- and second-cycle studies. The spreadsheet contained several pages with 
cells to be filled by inputting data from other reports along with other data, yielding output data 
through applying spreadsheet formulas. The latter ostensibly and formally aimed at calculating 
costs per student per each study type and for each programme. The tool was designed by a 
consultancy employed by the university. Users, in discussion, could not explain how teaching 
cost was actually calculated. Even for those proficient in conventional management accounting 
practice, the forms were very hard to unravel. First, they were not transparent regarding cell 
formulas: cells with calculations were blocked; descriptions were empty; there were multiple 
and iterative links to other files; cells containing assumptions and outcomes were indistinct. 
Difficulties were exacerbated by information overload. If some data outputs were synthetic and 
approximated, outcomes reflected a complexity of calculations and assumptions. Information 
overload connected to a chaos of juxtapositions effectively limited possibilities to understand 
calculations8VHUµLQIRUPDWLRQEOLQGQHVV¶ZDVDFhieved particularly through very detailed and 
intricate presentation of input data (mostly quantitative), repeated usage of the same data in 
different contexts (along with usage of different types of data in varied settings), usage of 
numerous variables with similar names or denoted in similar terms, apparently random mixing 
of fully articulated labels with abbreviated labels, and mixing of planned, actual and normative 
data. Readability was negatively impacted by using various colours in the spreadsheet for no 
clear reason.  
Informal talks with persons dealing with this lack of transparency revealed that the situation 
offered possibilities of creativity in producing final results. Analysis of usage of spreadsheet 
pages confirmed that by changing a few indicators one could significantly influence final 
programme cost. Understanding the algorithms was here unnecessary. Users saw a reason for 
the approach as facilitating justification of teaching costs. To provocative allegations raised by 
the researchers that this tool was incorrectly constructed or not useful for managers, responses 
mainly could be summarised as µLWPXVWEHFRUUHFW¶ Common arguments backing this were that 
the tool had been approved by the Rector, used by other universities, prepared by study cost 
calculation experts, used by all university units and, finally, had been used previously without 
anyone questioning the calculations. Questioning engendered distrust, closing lines of inquiry. 
Another area where the tactic of deploying complicated management accounting methods was 
applied was in internal financial settlements. At the university there were various algorithms of 
cost and benefit allocation. Besides overheads as a percentage of direct cost (supra), all units 
had to insert supplementary costs. Some of these arose from compulsory internal intra-unit 
cooperation, comprising space exploitation costs based on HDFK IDFXOW\¶V usable area, fixed 
costs of participation in compulsory parts of programmes per student, costs of implementing 
new IT systems and costs linked to intellectual property. Other internal settlement costs arose 
from voluntary intra-unit cooperation. These were, e.g., teaching costs of part-time programmes 
recalculated per student (or student group) and charges for leasing teaching rooms per 
hour/week. Another aspect settled at the university level was revenue. Calculations varied (see 
table 3), from applying fixed amounts in total or per student to complex budget allocation 
algorithms that were unknown (to those interacting with the system). 
Table 3 Some internal settlement formulas 
Allocation item Formula 
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Courses for full-time programmes from other 
faculties 
Complicated central algorithm for 
revenue allocation 
Courses for part-time programmes from other 
faculties 
Share in the programme revenues based 
on algorithm 
Participation in courses by Erasmus students 
from other faculties 
Unknown 
Joint university-level courses Unknown, said to be central algorithm 
Language courses  Cost allocation, standard rate per teaching 
hours 
Diplomas  Fixed rate per diploma 
Cost of lecture rooms for groups from other 
faculties 
Unknown 
 
Analysis of methods used indicated that compulsory charges were usually at maximum rates. 
They constituted additional revenue sources for AlphaPU faculties and were especially key for 
in-deficit units. The situation fostered continual pressure to increase the number of additional 
charges. Voluntary charge-setting was less strictly controlled. Internal costs and revenues were 
partly allocated to GLUHFW FRVWV DQG UHYHQXHV DQG SDUWO\ WR LQGLUHFW FRVWV PRVWO\ IDFXOW\¶V
overheads. Discussion with managers confirmed that the many approaches and modes of 
settlement also increased difficulties in terms of verification, planning and managerial usage.  
The most expansive and significant internal settlement system in the univHUVLW\¶VPDQDJHPHQW
accounting was the algorithm allocating teaching budget grants. During our research, this 
algorithm reflected WKH0LQLVWU\¶VDOORFDWLRQIRUPXOD(DFKIDFXOW\JDLQHGa grant reflecting 
LQSXW µHDUQHG IRU WKH 8QLYHUVLW\¶ %ODFNER[LQJ consisted in introducing to the formula a 
complicated mechanism for unit revenue settlements with a parallel hiding of data used in 
calculation. Given these rules, state budget funds were allocated via individual study tracks of 
over several thousands of students in numerous internal units. The settlement basis was through 
data transmitted by the units to a special university committee. Due to the breadth of the data 
sets, verification difficulties arose and managers were ignorant of actual numbers used in 
calculations. A similar situation was observed with elements of the algorithm. According to 
internal rules, settlements had to be officially sanctioned by the Rector. In practice, this 
rendered it difficult to assess the rationality of internal cooperation and its influence on results. 
Further, lack of knowledge about rules establishing allocation indexes and issues of their 
trustworthiness were discussed at many meetings. It was indicated that this factor sometimes 
discouraged faculties from engagement in new projects. However, the researchers observed that 
there were no official arguments against the amount of revenue allocated to units. 
From a legitimacy perspective, observed µEODFNER[LQJ¶ LQIOXHQFHG individual assessments, 
rendering them very difficult. This displaced challenges to legitimacy from individuals, who 
were also seeing that the information was being used. Assessing PHWKRGV¶ accuracy, fairness 
and effectiveness was seriously constrained making it difficult to verify the trustworthiness of 
accounting representations and the system more generally. From the perspective of report 
creators, the situation offered a façade for data manipulation. Further, the complexity and 
meticulousness of formula used conveyed an aura of practice being advanced and sophisticated 
(Gallhofer and Haslam, 1991). This was effectively a legitimacy source for both ceremonial 
and pro-effective accounting methods. Constraints upon individual-level assessments generated 
a source of legitimacy at the collective level. In the unit researched, the main arguments 
legitimising usage of specific accounting methods observed referred to important social actors 
(the Rector, experts), usage by other external and internal units and the length of time of usage. 
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Such phenomena impacted upon internal acceptance of methods which were seen as advanced 
and refined irrespective of pro-effectiveness. Despite methods¶ detailed make-up, output data 
was quite crudely aggregated, hampering pro-effective assessment of plans and related 
decision-making. 
Summarising, blackboxing is further manifestation of manipulations linked to reception of the 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VDFWLYLWLHV (Oliver, 1991). We uncovered that introducing complex calculation 
formulas together with other techniques of obfuscation in calculations and what they 
engendered in turn gave rise to a blackbox from the perspective of an addressee or observer. 
The absence of possibilities to verify information at the individual recipient level facilitates the 
internal legitimacy façade and diminishes risk of its perception (Suddaby et al., 2017). Together 
with legitimacy labelling, this tactic enabled the joint functioning of accounting solutions 
related to contending institutional logics. 
Deliberate complication of both formulas and data presentation rendered it difficult or near 
impossible for managers to appreciate any substantive cause-and-effect relations between 
decisions, actions and settlements and in the case reduced confidence in financial information. 
It created another reason for limiting in practice the scope of formal management accounting. 
Application of constructed methods contributed to a significant aggregation of data on the 
revenues and costs of didactic activity, limited the possibility of settlement to the level of 
internal units and obstructed development of methods for monitoring university activity in other 
cross-sections of the data (e.g. study types). The situation especially hindered implementation 
of central or inter-faculty initiatives, particularly when expected financial effects were difficult 
to estimate and uncover in relation to individual participants. This lack of control over 
substantive cause-effect relationships partially removed PDQDJHUV¶ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ for 
subordinate segment results, so pro-effective actions were in practice deemed of low import 
and beyond assessment. In turn, perceived need and demand for reliable and detailed 
management analyses was reduced. 
Shadow management accounting 
A further finding from our analysis of institutional pressures and their impact was the 
development of informal pro-effective methods of assessment here termed shadow 
management accounting, integral to individually and unofficially developed sets of analyses 
supporting effectiveness.16 Due to illegitimacy risk, this accounting was not formally 
demonstrated, staying in the shadow of official solutions. Observation of management practices 
indicated that ceremonial usage of some measurement methods encouraged managers to limit 
the scope of the official information system and leave reporting in highly aggregated form. 
Development of informal internal settlements and communications somewhat at variance from 
official patterns was fostered. Analyses indicating divergence of revenue and cost for particular 
programmes were not visible in official reports but mobilised by managers using their own 
sources. Results of such analyses functioned apart from official circulations as shadow 
components of management accounting. Officially, internal accounting records provided 
faculty financial results, while in practice they served accounting staff responsible for a 
reporting constrained to external expectations and requirements of university authorities.  
Observing discussions by managers about information scope, a particular paradox was 
identified. Managers often complained about lack of properly segmented information, 
                                                          
16
 8VDJHRIµVKDGRZ¶KHUHSDUDOOHOV XVDJHLQµshadow accounting¶ (Tregidga, 2017) in some ways but not others. 
It refers to a practice that is an alternative to the officially endorsed, but here one that is also internal to the 
organization and applied in supporting conventional economic functionality rather than tenets of a more wide-
UDQJLQJ&65RXUXVDJHLQGLFDWHVWKHFRPSOH[LW\RIµVKDGRZDFFRXQWLQJ¶FRQVLGHUHGDVDPRUHJHQHULFFRQVWUXFW 
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rendering decision-making RQSURJUDPPHVµEOLQG¶<HWmanagers shared the principle that the 
official system was to be aggregated as much as possible. The latter hindered insights in terms 
of pro-effectiveness and obstructed verification of complex calculations. But it diminished the 
risk of negative perception by various internal and external stakeholders. Paradoxically, the 
meticulous and elaborate possibilities of the settlement practices translated into provision of 
very aggregated and synthetic information. Derived allocations to segments served partly 
functional aims of splitting costs/benefits to responsibility centres and partly concerns to 
support legitimacy.  
Accounting representations/reports partly reflected expectations of the institutional milieu, the 
logic that costs legitimised fees. When managers in practice pursued aims divergent from this 
template, they made informal and unofficial settlements supported by separate records or 
arrangements. These were kept secret, only accessible to interested staff. Financial effects of 
such actions influenced segment results while formal requirements were met. Additional 
informal calculation methods were also used for managerial purposes at faculty level. 
Our observations and discussions indicated that managers seeking pro-effective improvements 
individually prepared informal analyses of actual or planned programme profitability. In most 
cases we explored, the numbers differed somewhat from those in official reports, being based 
on a pro-effective logic, i.e. on aspirations for revenue increases while controlling costs over 
time. Typically, methods used were less complicated. Shadow management accounting 
methods identified were selectively presented to a narrow group of decision-makers. They were 
neither debated in larger fora nor archived, invisible in official informings. 
The major users of the internal information system were managers and accounting staff. When 
analysing circulation of formal and informal information, we discovered a tendency: the more 
ceremonial the method, the more the accounting staff engaged in its usage. However, the greater 
the pro-effective importance of a particular method, the greater the involvement of management 
staff: in some cases, this was so great as to entail individual, independent search for data and 
the creation of informal assemblages. Analysis of practice indicated a quest for balancing 
formal and informal.  
The parallel existence of two contending logics fostered decoupling in management accounting. 
The formal part of the system was oriented towards legitimacy-seeking. It enriched the intricacy 
of reports delivered but restricted insight into university activities. Institutional pressures left 
management staff informally solving problems arising from incompatibility of operational 
actions with official logic. Owing to the need to supplement information deficiencies 
engendered by the officially implemented approach, informal management accountings were 
required. Illegitimacy risk thus fostered secrecy and independent implementation of calculative 
practices and management accountings by individual managers. Structural decoupling 
accompanied information decoupling. Accounting specialists were substantially involved in the 
IRUPDO V\VWHP 7KH LQIRUPDO ZDV WKH PDQDJHUV¶ GRPDLQ 'HFRXSOLQJ REVHUYHG ZDV QRW
complete, both in informational and structural strata. Between the strata there was minimal 
interaction. 
Summarising, shadow management accounting was a symptom of decoupling where one layer 
was informal and hidden. We reveal that this tactic reflected internal efforts to develop 
management accounting pro-effectiveness while concurrently supporting legitimacy. It could 
in part be seen as a form of comprise (Carlsson-Wall et al., 2013; Chenhall et al., 2013). The 
logic seeking to reduce illegitimacy risk helped to constitute a formal information system, 
whilst the logic shaping perceived management needs was reflected in informal reports and 
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Informal analyses helped supplement and compensate for deficiencies in formal management 
accounting. Due to limited access to reliable detailed information, these methods were very 
simple and mainly supported short-term operational decisions. Owing to the illegitimacy risk, 
conventional management accounting methods like market analyses of tuition fees, analyses of 
programme margins or decision analysis regarding programme organization were used by 
managers informally, remaining outside the official circulation of information. The scope of 
their usage was very diverse and depended upon individual managerial decision contexts. 
Aspirations to develop cooperation between units and to improve internal resource allocation 
engendered a process enhancing the usefulness of informal internal settlements. The lack of 
formalization led to another factor reducing transparency of university segments and inhibiting 
open discussion about their pro-effectiveness. The reduction in transparency was associated 
with placing preparation and usage of information in PDQDJHPHQW¶VKDQGV, while concurrently 
shifting to administrative (accounting) staff the responsibility for official, especially 
ceremonial, accountings. 
To help clarify the nature and significance of the tactics it is helpful to more explicitly explore 
their interactions. We now turn to this. 
Decoupling and counter-coupling 
Our case articulates more of the complexity involved when contending institutional logics 
engender illegitimacy risk and management accounting responses.  
Contradictory logics impacted not only management accounting in terms of serving the internal 
legitimacy façade but also the nature of how management accounting was mobilised to continue 
its pro-effective role. Thus, decoupling of management accounting manifested. Pro-effective 
and symbolic layers were linked intricately so that inconsistencies were hidden or displaced 
from attention.  
While ceremonial calculation seeks to construct the internal façade, shadow management 
accounting seeks to maintain pro-effectiveness. Ceremonial calculation is in part a 
hiding/displacement internally that is a contribution to or preparedness for a 
hiding/displacement externally, to accrue a silent, effective acceptance. Since shadow 
management accounting helps with pro-effectiveness it makes feasible and thus supports 
strategy to protect against illegitimacy risk. Paradoxically, the symbolic, which comes to 
disguise a failing to realise the cost approach in practice, is promoted as the formal, while the 
pro-effective is put into the background, the realm of the informal and shadow management 
accounting, an unusual practice of legitimising reflecting the divergent institutional pressures. 
Managers assumed the greater role in preparing and using shadow management accounting 
while accounting staff remained tied to formal and official accounting practices that were 
mainly ceremonial.  
That the symbolic layer is created through formal application of ceremonial methods confirms 
and adds to insights of Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Boxenbaum and Johnson (2008) and 
further supports Fernandez-Revuelta Perez and Robson (1999) and Rautiainen (2010): 
management accounting methods are used ceremonially to construct a legitimacy façade. The 
pro-effective layer is formed by shadow management accounting (consistent with Brunsson, 
1986). 
Legitimacy labelling and blackboxing reinforced each other and intermingled in relation to 
binding the symbolic and pro-effective layers of the management accounting system and 
maintaining organizational functioning and legitimacy. Legitimacy labelling encompasses dual 
meaning. On the one hand its figures, as presented, act as symbols, while for those better 
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appreciating the system they constitute pro-effective information. And legitimacy labelling 
enables transfer of symbolic meaning to pro-effective informative elements of accountings. It 
further supports the strategy to protect the organization from illegitimacy risk. Blackboxing 
makes it difficult for duality in management accountings to be appreciated internally and 
externally. It helps in effect to legitimise ceremonial calculation, mixing with legitimacy 
labelling. Blackboxing brings complexity and apparent sophistication which serves the strategy. 
Thus, these tactics construct specific types of link between the two layers that helps maintain 
some control. 
Observed usage of legitimacy labelling builds on insights into manipulation of activity 
descriptions in accounting reports (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1991; Ogden and Clarke, 2005), 
while findings of blackboxing build on insights of Oliver (1991) and Suddaby et al. (2017) 
concerning the significance of limited possibilities of information verification at recipient level.  
Given clearly contradictory institutional logics, not only was there search for compromise and 
decoupling (Carlsson-Wall et al., 2016), there was also search for information solutions that 
SDUWLFXODUO\ LQGLFDWH %UXQVVRQ¶V  QRWLRQ RI counter-coupling, within µWDONV¶ LH
management accounting). This constituted a component in protecting from illegitimacy risk. 
Counter-coupling is a phenomenon scarcely explicitly uncovered in management accounting 
UHVHDUFK EXW XQFRYHUHG KHUH WKURXJK WKH GHWDLOHG DQDO\VLV DQG WKH IRFXVHG µIUDJPHQWDU\¶
approach to legitimacy, here concentrating on particular dual logics (see Modell, 2003; Ogden 
and Clarke, 2005). 
As noted, the four tactics highlighted permitted and facilitated the combining of contradictory 
layers. From a pro-effective perspective, such protection hinders the transparency and 
accountability of organizational segments. There was shift of effort from developing 
management accounting knowledge (e.g. respecting financial consequences of 
decisions/activities) to maintaining the existing façade and organizational hypocrisy. It 
encouraged a view of accounting as detached from university activities. And additional skills 
of accounting system participants, who had to move smoothly between the layers, were 
demanded. 
Impact on management accounting 
We end this section by summarising key observed impacts on management accounting. 
Ceremonial calculations reduced transparency of actual decision-making criteria used in 
developing teaching offerings. These criteria became detached from DFWLYLWLHV¶ costs. Often 
decision-making was short-termist. Ceremonial calculations helped convince most staff that 
accounting had a constrained role regarding pro-effective decision-making and control and was 
rather geared to an externally-shaped legitimacy role. Legitimacy labelling transferred cost 
rhetoric to management discussions, limiting management acFRXQWLQJ¶V SUR-effectiveness. 
Managers substantially ignored financial information at the planning stage, especially since 
plans were known to be subject to later adjustment. Management accounting became a façade 
hiding segment shortfalls/surpluses. Blackboxing rendered it extremely difficult for managers 
to see substantive relationships in operating processes. It lowered the level of confidence in 
management accounting and again in practice constrained it.  
Management accountings were highly aggregated and of limited use for operational decisions, 
holding up initiatives. Managers were effectively encouraged to scarcely attend to pro-
effectiveness. Perceived needs and demands for pro-effective accounting were reduced. 
Shadow management accounting, used by managers informally and unofficially, compensated 
for some deficiencies in formal management accounting. Its scope was diverse and depended 
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upon the particular decision contexts of individual managers. There were even efforts to 
improve the working of internal settlements informally to render these more useful for internal 
resource allocation. But another impact of shadow management accounting was that the 
continued lack of formalization in effect facilitated reduction in the transparency of university 
segments and constrained discussion about pro-effectiveness.  
Research conclusions 
,QFRQFOXGLQJZHHPSKDVLVHRXUVWXG\¶VFRQWULEXWLRQVDQGDFNQRZOHGJHLWVOLPLWDWLRQV.  
We sought to clarify and further explore intricacies of the relationship between illegitimacy risk 
engendered by contradictory institutional logics and management accounting. In our case study 
of a Polish university we highlighted four adaptation tactics implicating internal accountings 
deployed as responses in legitimacy struggle. Reflecting the content and context of these tactics, 
we named them ceremonial calculations, legitimacy labelling, blackboxing and shadow 
management accounting. We elaborated upon these tactics in relation to the internal legitimacy 
façade, decoupling and how, together, they constituted a counter-coupling of the management 
accounting system.  
Our findings address and extend theoretical considerations on management accounting as tool 
and product of organizational legitimacy. Firstly, they illustrate how tensions in institutional 
milieu and corresponding organizational reactions intent on maintaining legitimacy impact 
management accounting. We further support the proposition that multiple contradictory logics 
impact on different dimensions of internal information systems (Townley, 2002; Rautiainen, 
2010; Ezzamel et al., 2012): the methods, structures and rhetoric used. Prior research (Moll and 
Hoque, 2011) indicates that in pursuing legitimacy, HE institutions modify and adapt 
management accountings. Noteworthy in our research is the influence of the type of pressure 
generated by the institutional environment (Bitektine and Haack, 2015). When the need to 
simply maintain legitimacy is seen as the response to take vis-à-vis perceived illegitimacy risk, 
the impact on management accounting can differ from when external pressure is seen to offer 
opportunities for the more positive improvement of social support. In our study, illegitimacy 
risk hindered the accuracy, transparency and formalization of management accounting. The 
internal information system acted not only as pro-effective tool but also as tool for protecting 
against illegitimacy risk.  
Secondly, our results indicate how contending logics impact in terms of decoupling 
management accounting. In calculative practices, besides the relatively easily seen layer of the 
façade whereby formal methods are symbolically used, there are also two other layers: informal 
informing (shadow management accounting) and the layer created by the joining of phenomena 
adjusted due to the conflicting logics (blackboxing and legitimacy labelling). Our findings 
confirm that, in pursuit of maintaining legitimacy, organizations construct internal façades 
(Fernandez-Revuelta Perez and Robson, 1999) using similar manoeuvres as when they disclose 
information externally (Elsbach, 1994; Ogden and Clarke, 2005; Cho et al., 2015a): intensifying 
legitimacy rhetoric; manipulating situational images; hiding that incompatible with 
expectations. Our study indicated that creation of the legitimacy façade impacted on various 
management accounting dimensions: methods used; formation and usage of information within 
structures; level of formalization of procedures and reports; application of particular calculation 
formulas; selection and presentation of data; precision and significance of constructed images; 
labels used to present and describe numbers and particular financial values/figures registered in 
reports.  
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0DQRHXYUHVLGHQWLILHGDUHJRRGH[DPSOHVRIµRUJDQL]HGK\SRFULV\¶ (Brunsson, 1986), at the 
OHYHORIµWDONV¶LQFLUFXPVWDQFHVZKHUHWKHXQLYHUVLW\ZDQWVWRDFWDVLWVHHVILWZKLOHPHHWLQJ
strong pressures arising from external institutional contradictions. Indeed, given the clearly 
contradictory logics (with little scope to compromise), a third conclusion here is that we found 
SUDFWLFHVLQGLFDWLYHRI%UXQVVRQ¶VQRWLRQRIcounter-coupling. Our study adds to Cho et 
al. (2015a) but reflecting focus on the internal organizational context. We found contradictory 
orientations within management accounting, ZLWKLQµWDONV¶FRQVLVWHQWZLWKµcounter-coupling¶
facilitating the effort to protect the organization from the illegitimacy risk arising from the 
contradictory logics. 
A further conclusion here concerns the peculiarity of HE institutions¶PDQDJHPHQWDFFRXQWLQJ. 
Our study, consistent with prior research focused on other countries (Modell, 2003; Moll and 
Hoque, 2011), indicates the influence of state agencies as representatives of legislators and 
funders. To impact, these agencies transmit to academic centres specific logic-confirming 
and/or logic-creating frameworks for HE. Contradictions in this field affect the rhetoric of legal 
regulations forming a façade at the level of the whole system transmitted to that of the 
universities, and to university management accounting particularly. In the public institution, 
there is a strong non-profit ORJLFZKLFKGLYHUJHVIURPPDQDJHPHQWDFFRXQWLQJ¶VGRPLQDQWDQG
conventional profit-orientation. Our case demonstrates that, besides the tendency to hide 
margins/profits as indicated in previous research (Moll and Hoque, 2011), the logic of the public 
institution fosters usage of cost rhetoric in reporting. The pervasive naming of accounting 
categories/terms with cost labels is a type of ceremonial demonstration of non-profit 
performance. 
We can reflect here on implications for management accounting. The study contributes to a 
better understanding RI PDQDJHPHQW DFFRXQWLQJ¶V IXQFWLRQLQJ LQ RUJDQL]DWLRQV VXJJHVWLQJ 
implications for systems design (e.g. in terms of preserving pro-effectiveness while 
maintaining, hopefully meaningful, notions of legitimacy) and also for openness about the 
character of management accounting practice and more generally for any sensitive forming of 
regulatory approaches (reflecting contextual appreciation).  
Our research has some limitations related to its approach. Further analyses of the influence of 
legitimacy processes on management accounting could add greater validation to and extend our 
conclusions. Especially intriguing for further research are issues concerning management 
accounting¶VFRPSOH[UROH in relation to organisational hypocrisy more generally, as adhesive 
connecting talks, decisions and actions in the context of contending logics of an unstable 
institutional milieu. 
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